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1 Introduction 
 
 
 
The 2007 annual conference organised by the Dutch insolvency practitioners 
association Insolad deals with the subject matter of 'De integere curator' (the 
righteous, incorruptible bankruptcy trustee). The first thought that came to mind 
was that such theme is a pleonasm and superfluous: by definition, a bankruptcy 
trustee (hereafter shortly referred to as 'trustee') should and must be a 
righteous person. Otherwise, he or she is unfit to act as such. Or is there 
something going wrong; are trustees sometimes not righteous? This has been 
suggested in the media and on the internet.  
 
In this contribution a view is presented on the topic from a Dutch perspective, 
more specifically from the point of view of the creditors and their (lack of) 
influence on the appointment of the trustee. Their involvement with the issue of 
the righteousness or integrity of the trustee can be twofold: they might suffer 
from acts by the trustee that they consider not to be righteous, but they can 
also benefit from such acts. With respect to the latter, one should think of 
creditors who for example were involved in fraudulent conveyance transactions: 
their concern is to persuade the trustee to overlook those acts. 
 
                                            
* Prof Reinout Vriesendorp. Faculty of Law, University of Tilburg. This article is an 
adaptation of my contribution De invloed van crediteuren op de aanstelling van een 
integere curator, see Vriesendorp Invloed van Crediteuren 41-50. I would like to thank 
Colin Anderson, Andre Boraine, David Burdette, Juanita Calitz, Anneli Loubser, John 
Pottow, Paul Omar and Adrian Walters for providing me with useful material and 
information on the topic. 
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Before the issue of integrity is discussed from the perspective of the creditors, 
the following questions need to be addressed: what is integrity or righteousness 
in the context of the topic of this contribution; what is meant by 'a righteous 
trustee'; why do we need a righteous trustee; and how do we reach our goal (§ 
2)? Next, an investigation follows of the existing safeguards to prevent non-
righteous persons to be enrolled or appointed as trustees (§ 3-4). 
Subsequently, the position of the creditors in this respect is discussed, with a 
limited focus on their influence on the appointment of the trustee.  
 
It should be noted that this contribution is based on the current Dutch legal 
system. However, a quick glance at various neighbouring jurisdictions, 
demonstrates that not much has been regulated in the Netherlands (§ 5). 
Finally, the question is raised whether or not more creditor involvement in the 
appointment process is required or desired (§ 6). It shall be argued that there is 
no need to increase their influence.  
 
 
2 Integrity and the righteous trustee 
According to the Compact Oxford English Dictionary, righteous means 'morally 
right or justifiable'. According to the authoritative dictionary of Van Dale in the 
Netherlands the Dutch noun integriteit (integrity) means: rechtschapenheid 
(righteousness), onschendbaarheid (immunity) and onomkoopbaarheid 
(incorruptibleness). Based on the Latin word integer, it refers to the notion of 
gaafheid (being intact, untouched), ongerept (unspoilt), niet geplunderd (not 
looted) and in a moral sense it means: onbeslist (undecided), verstandig 
(sensible, reasonable), zonder vooroordelen (without prejudice), rechtschapen 
(honourable), onbedorven (untainted), rein van levenswandel (clean in 
conduct). Paraphrasing, righteousness or integrity implies that the trustee will 
keep his back straight, set his course and will not be improperly influenced nor 
act improperly himself. He may not confuse his own interest with the interests 
that are entrusted to him.  
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The integrity of the trustee is an absolute requirement, because it is his or her 
duty to manage the assets of a person who is declared bankrupt by the court 
and to dispose of those assets for the benefit of the creditors of that person. 
The trustee is empowered over another person's estate who himself has been 
deprived of all control. The right use of his powers and the necessity of abuse 
by the trustee is not only relevant for the debtor and his creditors, but also 
required from a societal perspective. The trustee is the person whom the 
legislator deems fit to wind up the estate of a (legal) person which is insufficient 
to satisfy the claims of all the creditors. Such winding-up happens, by definition, 
in an environment of conflicting interests. Hence, the integrity of the trustee is a 
prerequisite, next to expertise and experience. A trustee should not only be 
competent as to the material aspects of his or her profession, but must also 
demonstrate behaviour on which the general public can rely without any 
hesitation. The latter is even more important as the trustee's remuneration 
generally depends on the same estate that must satisfy the creditors. This is 
the case in the Netherlands, where the distribution of the proceeds of the estate 
with respect to the trustee has priority over all other persons involved. It could 
raise some doubts whether such person will indeed properly subordinate his 
own interests to those of the person whose assets he manages or in whose 
interests he is appointed. Hence, integrity of the trustee is an absolute must. 
 
The prerequisite of integrity is not restricted to one moment in time, like a 
photograph. It is more like a movie in a sense that integrity is required from the 
beginning to the end. In other words, the trustee's integrity is imperative from 
the moment someone informs the court that he would like to be eligible for 
appointment as trustee until the final statement of accounts of his last 
bankruptcy. Roughly speaking, this period can be divided into three phases. 
First of all the phase with respect to the appointment as trustee, which relates 
both to the application to the court for enrolment on the list of trustees in 
general on the one hand and the appointment in a specific bankruptcy on the 
other hand. The second phase deals with the behaviour of the trustee during 
the bankruptcy in which righteous acting by the trustee is required. He must 
honourably deal with the debtor's estate, which means that he must carefully 
manage the assets and prevent unnecessary debts of the estate to arise. This 
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coincides with a correct treatment of all persons involved and an adequate 
(financial) account of his or her actions. This last aspect forms the third and 
final phase which relates to the termination of a specific bankruptcy: the trustee 
must then report on his management and administration of the estate and the 
financial transactions he has performed. As mentioned before, this contribution 
is limited to a discussion of the first phase, viz of the appointment as trustee: 
how can it be ensured that only righteous persons, persons of integrity, will be 
appointed as trustees? 
 
 
3 Integrity and the appointment of trustees: enrolment by the court 
As a start, it is relevant to know that Netherlands law does not have any formal 
requirements to be met before a person can be appointed as a trustee. Any 
person – in theory even minors or people who lack the capacity to enter into 
legal acts – could be appointed as trustee. Because the current 
Faillissementswet (NFw; Dutch Bankruptcy Act; enacted in 1893 and in force 
since 1896) does not contain any requirements for eligibility as trustee, it does 
not result in a sorting between righteous and non-righteous persons. In the 
Dutch insolvency practice, however, the courts almost always appoint lawyers 
who are members of the bar as trustees. Hence, a certain selection can be 
reached along this detour, because not everyone is admitted to the bar. For 
admission one needs to qualify, which means that one has to comply with the 
statutory requirements set forth in the Advocatenwet (Law on the Bar). First of 
all these requirements relate to knowledge and competence of the prospective 
member of the bar. Furthermore, his or her integrity comes into view because a 
formal document must be submitted, presented by the board of the municipality 
with respect to one's behaviour (a so-called Verklaring omtrent het gedrag; 
declaration on behaviour) and to the extent necessary, a declaration that one 
has not been subject to any disciplinary sanction1
                                            
1  Almost 20 decisions of the last two decades of the Disciplinary Boards (Raden van 
Discipline) and the ultimate Disciplinary Court (Hof van Discipline) of the Nederlandse 
Orde van Advocaten (Dutch Bar Association) are related to improper behaviour by lawyers 
 nor been declared bankrupt 
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nor subject to the Wet schuldsaneringsregeling natuurlijke personen ('Wsnp'; 
statutory restructuring proceedings for individuals; title III NFw).2
A next possibility for assessing the integrity of a prospective trustee occurs at 
the time such person approaches the court with the request to be enrolled for 
appointment as trustee. In this respect the attitude of the courts has changed 
dramatically in the last decades. Previously, the court more or less as a matter 
of course appointed any new member of the bar almost immediately as trustee 
in a simple bankruptcy. Nowadays, however, this will not occur anymore. The 
courts will appoint persons only as trustee when they consider such person 
capable and sufficiently experienced to handle the bankruptcy. In the beginning 
a relatively short and simple extra course in Bankruptcy Law was sufficient for 
eligibility as trustee during the last period of the formal three-year 
apprenticeship of the bar. After the introduction of more difficult specialisation 
courses, developed by Grotius Academie and Insolad in a joint effort with 
universities, law firms, judges and business lawyers in the beginning of the 
1990s, a tendency has arisen that the courts require successful attendance and 
completion of the Grotius/Insolad course – or similar training – as measurable 
start qualification.
 Furthermore, 
integrity is indirectly involved in the admission proceedings to the bar upon 
making the oath or vow at the court session. 
 
3
 
 Last year the courts are even further decreasing the group 
of persons eligible for appointment as trustee. However, it remains unclear to 
the outside world on the basis of which exact criteria the courts make their 
decisions. Through the grapevine it can be heard that some courts also 
consider the economics for a viable insolvency practice as a relevant factor for 
eligibility. By doing so, they are able to grant a sufficient number of 
bankruptcies to all eligible trustees to maintain accurate and adequate 
knowledge and experience in this area. 
                                                                                                                               
in connection with a bankruptcy or as trustee. See NOVA http://www.advocatenorde.nl 16 
Feb. 
2  Art 2 Advocatenwet. 
3  The local guidelines that are published by the courts with respect to their dealing with 
insolvency show a mix of more or less detailed requirements for appointment. The gist, 
however, is that each court has limited a number of potential trustees. 
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With respect to the courts that require certain professional training it is 
interesting to note that the requirements for successful completion are primarily 
focused on the acquisition of knowledge and practical competencies rather than 
a correct professional attitude. For example the prestigious Grotius/Insolad 
course on Insolvency law requires a sufficient mark on the average of all 
coursework and a sufficient result in the final oral exam.4
4 Integrity and the appointment as trustee in a specific bankruptcy 
 Attitude and 
behaviour, however, are not taught and integrity in itself is not examined at all. 
Consequently, successful completion of this course does not provide any 
guarantee with respect to the integrity of the prospective trustee who requests 
enrolment on the list of eligible trustees.  
 
Finally, even the Insolad-membership that some courts require or prefer for 
eligibility does not imply integrity of the trustee. Article 3 of the Articles of 
Association of Insolad requires only a minimum amount of hours spent on 
insolvency law and sufficient expertise on the basis of education and 
experience. A favourable reading of this last requirement might imply that the 
membership is only open to righteous trustees. 
 
 
As described above, the first selection has been made by enrolment on the 
court's list of prospective trustees. The question about the integrity of the 
trustee becomes acute upon his appointment in a specific bankruptcy. 
According to paragraph 6 of the Bankruptcy Guidelines5
                                            
4  Art 4 of the Examination Rules of the Grotius/Insolad course. 
, the court's clerk 
immediately approaches the prospective trustee after the court session where 
the debtor has been declared bankrupt. The sole purpose is to check whether 
or not there is a (potential) conflict of interest. Although important, the issue of 
conflicting interests is only one of the aspects of integrity. In the event there is 
no conflict of interests "then the trustee will be appointed" according to the 
5  These so-called RECOFA-Richtlijnen (REchters-COmmissarissen in FAillissementen; 
Bankruptcy Guidelines), made up by the joint judges-delegates of all District Courts in the 
Netherlands who supervise individual bankruptcies were introduced in the last part of the 
previous century and lastly revised per RECOFA http://www.rechtspraak.nl/ 18 Feb. 
RD VRIESENDORP  PER/PELJ  2008(11)1 
        / 211   145 
compelling language of this provision in paragraph 6.1. Nonetheless, this is not 
all: before the court's clerk approaches the prospective trustee the court has 
already made a selection of this person. The selection process is normally an 
unclear and mystic process that occurs in secrecy within the walls of the closed 
courtroom, where judge and clerk determine the prospective trustee to be 
appointed. In this process, various aspects are relevant, as I have become 
anecdotally aware from discussions with bankruptcy judges(-delegate). 
Depending on the (expected) size of the bankruptcy, earlier experiences with 
possible trustees (with respect to their procedural handling of the bankruptcy as 
well as their material treatment of the issues involved), appreciation or 
complaints regarding previous bankruptcies, the court decides who it will 
appoint. Also, the court will take into account how often the prospective trustee 
(or any other person of his or her law firm) has been recently appointed. 
Furthermore, personal preferences of the judge sometimes influence the choice 
of the trustee.6
5 Role of the creditors 
 Dealing with all these aspects should result in an adequate, 
vigorous and trouble-free treatment of the prospective bankruptcy. In this 
respect integrity is presupposed, because a non-righteous person will be 
removed from the court's list. However, integrity as such is in itself not a 
touchstone anymore at this stage. 
 
 
In this contribution to this point, creditors and their role in the appointment 
process have not been discussed. This is because creditors are not involved in 
this process in the Netherlands. Not only in the event the debtor requested its 
own bankruptcy – in which case creditors are normally not involved at all – but 
also if a creditor has filed for bankruptcy, his role in the appointment process is 
quite negligible. In the absence of the debtor against whom the petition is filed 
by a creditor, the court is sometimes inclined to ask the creditor for information 
                                            
6  With the risk that the appointment of the trustee is not an impartial process, as seemed to 
have occurred quite often at the time of the enactment of the present Bankruptcy Act in 
1893. Such risk, however, seemed – and seems – not to be cured with statutory 
measures; Van der Feltz Geschiedenis 324. 
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about the debtor. Normally, however, the court does not discuss the person of 
the prospective trustee – and certainly not his integrity – with the creditor. Only 
after the trustee is indeed appointed and has begun his activities in the 
bankruptcy, the issue of his integrity starts playing a role. From that moment, 
creditors may approach the rechter-commissaris (judge-delegate) who 
supervises the trustee in the specific bankruptcy, with complaints about the 
(integrity of the) trustee. They can elicit an order from the judge-delegate on the 
basis of article 69 Fw, ordering or prohibiting certain actions with respect to the 
management and administration of the estate by the trustee. In the context of 
the integrity issue, one could think of a trustee extracting assets from the estate 
or the sale of assets to friends or related parties below market value.7 Pursuant 
to article 73 Fw those creditors may in grievous circumstances even request 
the court to dismiss the trustee.8
5.1 Germany 
 
 
All in all, the influence of the creditors with respect to the appointment of a 
trustee is almost absent in the Netherlands, not to mention that issues 
concerning the trustee's integrity are not dealt with at all. Is there no other 
option or do alternatives exist? What happens for example in our neighbouring 
countries? 
 
 
Pursuant to § 56 paragraph 1 Insolvenzordnung ('InsO'; German Insolvency 
Act) the following person is eligible for appointment as Insolvenzverwalter 
(bankruptcy trustee) in our eastern neighbouring jurisdiction:  
 
eine für den jeweiligen Einzelfall geeignete, insbesondere 
geschäftskundige und von den Gläubigern und dem Schuldner 
unabhängige natürliche Person [...], die aus dem Kreis aller zur 
                                            
7  Eg disciplinary rulings of the Disciplinary Board Leeuwarden of 27 March 1987 and 15 
March 1991 (Disciplinary Board Leeuwarden Advocatenblad 1988 and 1992). 
8  Rechtbank (District Court) Rotterdam 21 June 2007, LJN BA7841. In Hoge Raad 
(Supreme Court) 22 September 2006, LJN AY5700, conflicting behaviour did not result in 
dismissal of the trustee, according to the preceding opinion of Advocate-General 
Timmerman. Available at http://www.rechtspraak.nl. 
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Übernahme von Insolvenzverwaltungen bereiten Personen 
auszuwählen ist.9
However, contrary to the situation in the Netherlands, creditors in a German 
insolvency have a direct opportunity to exert influence on the appointment of 
the trustee, without being forced to use the detour of dismissal of the trustee. 
According to § 57 InsO the creditors can propose by majority vote in the first 
Gläubigerversammlung (creditors' meeting) another person to be appointed as 
trustee. Only if this person is considered not to be suited for handling the 
insolvency, the court will refrain from the appointment. The mere fact that this 
person has been chosen on recommendation of the largest creditor does not 
make him unsuitable.
  
 
10 Comparable to the Dutch situation is that the German 
trustee may be dismissed by the court for an important reason (§ 59 InsO). The 
provisions concerning appointment and dismissal in §§ 56-59 InsO form an 
exhaustive and exclusive system, as the German Supreme Court decided in 
the beginning of 2007.11
5.2 Belgium  
 
 
 
The selection and appointment of the trustee is extensively dealt with in the 
Faillissementswet (BFw; Belgian Bankruptcy Act) of our southern neighbouring 
jurisdiction. Pursuant to article 11 BFw the trustee will be elected from a list of 
eligible persons. This group has been designated by the Rechtbank van 
Koophandel (Commercial Court) in accordance with article 27 BFw. Refusal to 
be put on that list or deletion from that list is subject to judicial review (article 28 
BFw). However, only persons that are admitted to the bar may be placed on the 
list after completion of a special training and demonstration of their competence 
with regard to insolvency proceedings. One could argue that these 
requirements imply integrity of the trustee, as also seems to be confirmed by 
                                            
9  Translation: "An independent individual suited to the specific case at hand, independent of 
the creditors and of the debtor, to be chosen from the group of persons experienced in 
administering insolvencies." 
10  BGH 17.7.2003 – IX ZB 530/02 Bundesgerichtshof (German Supreme Court) available at 
http://www.bundesgerichtshof.de/.  
11  BGH 25.1.2007 – IX ZB 240/05. 
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the provision in article 40 BFw containing the general duty of care imposed on 
the trustee: he must administer the bankruptcy as a 'good housefather' under 
supervision of the judge-delegate. With respect to the specific issue of 
conflicting interests, Belgian law contains an explicit and rather extensive 
regulation in articles 30-32 BFw: upon acceptance of his appointment, the 
trustee is obliged to inform the court of any activity, by himself or any of his 
partners or direct associates in his firm, other than acting as trustee, on behalf 
of the bankrupt (legal) person, its directors or representatives or any creditor 
during the last 18 months prior to the bankruptcy.12
5.3 France 
 In such case the court has 
the discretion to forgo the appointment or – if the conflicting interest appears 
after the appointment as trustee – to dismiss the trustee (article 31 BFw) or to 
appoint temporarily a special trustee, the curator ad hoc (article 32 BFw). 
However, Belgian law does not contain any provision requiring a specific 
involvement of the creditors with respect to the appointment of the trustee.  
 
 
France has a variety of insolvency proceedings in connection with the 
restructuring of enterprises. One of the central persons in such proceedings is 
the so-called mandataire judiciaire (court-appointed receiver). It is his or her 
duty to represent the creditors and to liquidate the assets of the enterprise.13 
Due to various scandals and excesses in the treatment of insolvencies in the 
last decade of the 20th century because of narrow ties between the court and 
certain insolvency practitioners, the insolvency legislation was amended in 
2003.14 Currently, the appointment as mandataire judiciaire requires various 
quality requirements to be met.15 Pursuant to these provisions the mandataire 
judiciaire must be enrolled on a national list of insolvency practitioners.16
                                            
12  Art 30 BFw. According to the – originally in 2002 amended art 30 BFw this information had 
to be filed with the – public – bankruptcy file kept by the court. The Belgian Arbitragehof 
(Court of Arbitration 24 March 2004, 50/2004) annulled this part of the amendment 
because of the disproportionality. 
13  Art L812-1 CdC. 
14  Omar Reforms 111-150. 
15  Book VIII CdC, art L812-1 ff. 
16  Art L812-1 CdC. 
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According to article L.812-3 Code de Commerce (CdC; French Commercial 
Code) such person must fulfil several requirements, partly related to his 
nationality (French nationality or citizen of another EU-member state), partly to 
his behaviour (no criminal, administrative or disciplinary sanctions arising from 
indecent or dishonest behaviour (faits contraires à l'honneur ou à la probité) nor 
being subject to any of the French insolvency proceedings) and partly to his 
competence (successful completion of the apprenticeship in the field of 
insolvencies).17 Moreover, the insolvency practitioners have adopted a code of 
conduct (Charte qualité des administrateurs et des mandataires judiciaires) 
pursuant to which they will behave conform governmental professional rules 
and (ethical) standards.18
Subsequently, the mandataire judiciaire will be appointed in a specific 
insolvency proceeding, provided that he demonstrates that he has not been in 
any way involved with the (legal) person subject to the insolvency proceeding 
since five years prior to his appointment.
 
 
19
6 Towards more creditor involvement in the appointment process? 
 It is, however, the discretion of the 
court to determine which mandataire judiciaire it will appoint from the national 
list. In this respect, creditors do not have any specific role. 
 
 
Against the background of the developments in the surrounding jurisdictions 
one could raise the question if, and to what extent, more attention should be 
paid to the integrity of the trustee, as seen from the creditors' perspective and – 
in view of the limited scope of this contribution – more in particular, their 
involvement in the appointment process in the Netherlands. Apart from the 
question if such involvement would be possible (which, personally, it is thought 
to be), a more important question is whether such involvement would also be 
necessary. 
 
                                            
17  AJMJ Devenir mandataire de justice http://www.ajmj.fr/ 27 Feb.  
18  AJMJ Charte http://www.ajmj.fr/ 27 Feb.  
19  Art L812-2 CdC. 
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A nuanced answer – yes and no – might be expected; however is not what is 
proposed. On the one hand, more involvement can be justified by the fact that 
an insolvency in the Netherlands will ultimately affect the value of the creditors' 
claims. They have entered into a relationship with the debtor who does not 
perform his or her obligations. Most likely, they have or should have at least 
some insight in the activities of the debtor. As a result, they will be the most 
appropriate party to choose the most successful trustee. Indeed, if they choose 
the wrong person, they will notice the adverse consequences in their wallet. On 
the other hand, more involvement of the creditors in the appointment process 
could result in the risk that a partial trustee might be appointed. It is not always 
clear who are the relevant parties, including the most important creditors, in the 
period just before the declaration of the bankruptcy. The concurrence of the 
creditors in this chaotic and hectic period often creates a situation where it 
might be doubtful that the trustee who is proposed by certain creditors is 
sufficiently impartial with respect to the interests of those creditors. This is 
considered a significant impediment against more creditor involvement, 
because it is the primary duty of the trustee to deal correctly with all creditors' – 
often conflicting – claims in accordance with their respective ranks. It is not so 
strange that exactly this aspect of potential conflicting interests plays a 
significant role in our surrounding jurisdictions. Although possible, more 
involvement of the creditors in the appointment process is therefore opposed.  
 
 
7 Final remarks 
The negative answer to the question whether creditors should become more 
involved in the appointment process of the trustee in the Netherlands, does not 
mean that the creditors should not interfere with the administration of the 
bankrupt estate by the trustee afterwards. To the contrary, it is their 
fundamental right to be involved and to keep an eye on the trustee. In the event 
he or she does not like such active creditors, then their appointment should not 
be accepted. Eventually, the judge-delegate who might get involved by too 
active and meddlesome creditors requesting him or her court-orders against the 
trustee on the basis of article 69 NFw, can – and must – resist such actions 
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should they result in too much delay and extra costs. The court will and can 
only do so with sufficient authority, provided that trustees demonstrate an 
impeccable behaviour.  
 
The same applies to the appointment process by the court. This must be a 
transparent and verifiable process in order to prevent partial practices, such as 
the ones that occurred in France at the end of last century20 or by certain Dutch 
courts before our present Bankruptcy Act was enacted at the end of the 19th 
century.21 Statutory provisions fail to prevent such abuse, as was already 
observed at that time. Such prevention is only possible if there is an attitude of 
candour by the court: towards the trustees, creditors, debtor and all other 
parties involved. However, it is not considered necessary to create a closed, 
well-regulated profession of insolvency practitioners, like nowadays for example 
in France and England. In a contribution in the Dutch Insolvency Law Review in 
2005, the introduction of an autonomous disciplinary rules system for Dutch 
trustees has already been suggested.22 In combination with thorough education 
(with exams) and practical competence requirements, such rules could justify 
the formation of a closed community, or at least a preference in the 
appointment as trustee by the court. In view of the current topic, the trustee's 
integrity might be added as a separate issue, although it will not require specific 
rules or legislation. Such rules seem quite useless where it will probably result 
in risky behaviour testing the boundaries, with all its consequences and only the 
appearance of certainty.23 Hence, the preliminary draft for a new Dutch 
Insolvency Act that was presented to the Dutch Minister of Justice on 
November 1, 2007,24
                                            
20  Omar Reforms 111-150. 
21  Parliamentary Report, art 13 (now 14) NFw, Van der Feltz Geschiedenis 324. 
22  Vriesendorp 2005 TvI 11. 
 does not contain any provision to that extent. Moreover, 
such regulation of the integrity of the trustee seems superfluous. Was it not a 
long time ago that the famous Roman emperor Justinian, following the brilliant 
23  A typical example can be found in the practice rules and the discussions of these rules; 
see Insolad http://www.insolad.nl/ 18 Feb. According to some practitioners, these rules are 
mere an open door and lack a specific meaning; others consider the scope of the rules 
unclear. The instrument of the English Insolvency Practitioners Regulations is in my view 
an example of rules that overshot themselves; see English Insolvency Practitioners 
Regulations http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ 18 Feb. 
24  See Justitie http://www.justitie.nl/ 18 Feb.  
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lawyer Ulpian, ordered that one has to live an honourable life (honeste 
vivere)?25
                                            
25  Inst 1,1,3 en D 1,1,10,1. 
 This means that a court should not hesitate to take adequate 
measures – in accordance with the fundamental principles of due process 
(such as audi alterem partem) – if in a dispute between (one of) the creditors 
and the trustee, the latter's integrity is at stake. A person is either righteous or 
not – there is nothing in between – and a trustee is supposed to be righteous. 
In case a trustee lacks integrity, such person is unfit for his or her office and 
there can only be one remedy: he or she should not be available anymore as 
trustee and to the extent necessary, must be removed from any trustees' list or 
register. 
RD VRIESENDORP  PER/PELJ  2008(11)1 
        / 211   153 
Bibliography 
 
Disciplinary Board Leeuwarden 1988 Advocatenblad 
Disciplinary Board Leeuwarden "Disciplinary rulings: 27 March 1987" 
Advocatenblad  (22 January 1988) 
 
Disciplinary Board Leeuwarden 1992 Advocatenblad   
Disciplinary Board Leeuwarden "Disciplinary rulings: 15 March 1991" 
Advocatenblad  (16 January 1992) 
 
Omar Reforms 111-150  
Omar PJ "Reforms to the Framework of Insolvency Law and Practice in 
France: 1996-2006" in Broc GK and Parry R (eds) Corporate Rescue: An 
Overview of Recent Developments 2nd ed (Kluwer Deventer 2006) 
 
Van der Feltz Geschiedenis 324  
Van der Feltz GW Geschiedenis van de Faillissementswet I (De Erven F 
Bohn Haarlem 1896) 
 
Vriesendorp 2005 TvI 11  
Vriesendorp RD "Transparantie en zelfregulering: VIA Insolad naar VIS?" 
2005 TvI 11 
 
Vriesendorp Invloed van Crediteuren 41-50 
Vriesendorp R "De Invloed van Crediteuren op de Aanstelling van een 
Integere Curator" in De Ranitz SH et al (ed) De Integere Curator Insolad 
Yearbook 2007 (Kluwer Deventer 2007) 
 
Register of legislation 
Advocatenwet (Dutch Law on the Bar)  
Code de Commerce (CdC) (French Commercial Code)  
Faillissementswet (BFw) (Belgian Bankruptcy Act)  
Faillissementswet (NFw) 1896 (Dutch Bankruptcy Act) 
Insolvenzordnung (InsO) (German Insolvency Act) 
RD VRIESENDORP  PER/PELJ  2008(11)1 
        / 211   154 
Wet schuldsaneringsregeling natuurlijke personen (Wsnp) (Statutory 
restructuring proceedings for individuals) 
 
Register of court cases 
Arbitragehof 24 March 2004 50/2004 
BGH 17.7.2003 – IX ZB 530/02 
BGH 25.1.2007 – IX ZB 240/05 
Hoge Raad 22 September 2006 LJN AY5700 
Rechtbank 21 June 2007 LJN BA7841 
 
Register of Internet resources 
 
AJMJ Charte http://www.ajmj.fr/ 27 Feb 
Conseil National des Administrateurs Judiciaires Charte Qualite des 
Administrateurs et des Mandataires Judiciaires [Found on internet] 
http://www.ajmj.fr/charte_qualite/38.FR.php [Date of use 27 February 2008] 
 
AJMJ Devenir mandataire de justice http://www.ajmj.fr/ 27 Feb 
Conseil National des Administrateurs Judiciaires Devenir mandataire de 
justice [Found on internet] 
http://www.ajmj.fr/devenir_mandataire/33.FR.php [Date of use 27 February 
2008] 
 
English Insolvency Practitioners Regulations http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ 18 Feb 
English Insolvency Practitioners Regulations Statutory Instruments 2005 
No 524 [Found on internet] 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2005/uksi_20050524_en.pdf [Date of use 18 
February 2008] 
 
Insolad http://www.insolad.nl/ 18 Feb 
Insolad Praktijkregels [Found on internet] 
http://www.insolad.nl/overinsolad/praktijkregels [Date of use 18 February 
2008] 
 
RD VRIESENDORP  PER/PELJ  2008(11)1 
        / 211   155 
Justitie http://www.justitie.nl/ 18 Feb  
Ministerie van Justitie Commissie insolventierecht Voorontwerp Insolventie 
Wet 2007 [Found on internet] 
http://www.justitie.nl/images/VoorontwerpInsolventiewet_tcm34-87549.pdf 
[Date of use 18 February 2008] 
 
NOVA http://www.advocatenorde.nl 16 Feb 
Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten Disciplinaire uitsprake deur de Raden 
van Discipline en de Hof van Discipline [Found on internet] 
http://www.advocatenorde.nl/algemeen/organisatie/disciplinaire_uitspraken.
asp [Date of use 16 February 2008] 
 
RECOFA http://www.rechtspraak.nl/ 18 Feb  
Rechters-commissarissen in Faillissementen Richtlijnen voor 
faillissementen en surseances van betaling 2004 [Found on internet]  
http://www.rechtspraak.nl/NR/rdonlyres/17A7E56D-3B7A-4CC8-8663-
5BBD10AB1675/0/Rrrichtlijnenjuli2004doc.pdf [Date of use 18 February 
2008] 
 
List of abbreviations 
art     article(s) 
BFw     Faillissementswet (Belgian Bankruptcy Act) 
BGH     Bundesgerichtshof (German Supreme Court) 
CdC     Code de Commerce (French Commercial Code)  
ch     chapter(s) 
Fw      Faillissementswet (Dutch Bankruptcy Act) 
InsO     Insolvenzordnung 
NFw     Faillissementswet 
NOVA    Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten (Dutch Bar Association) 
par     paragraph(s) 
RECOFA   Rechters-commissarissen in Faillissementen 
reg regulation(s) 
s     section(s) 
sch     schedule(s) 
RD VRIESENDORP  PER/PELJ  2008(11)1 
        / 211   156 
Wsnp     Wet schuldsaneringsregeling natuurlijke personen  
